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Abstract 
The Cotonou Partnership Agreement, signed in 2000 and set to expire in 2020, is allegedly 
the most advanced collaboration between the EU and some of the lowest-income countries 
in the world. In practice, however, its achievements are meagre and contested. Nonetheless, 
the EU and ACP countries officially launched in 2018 the negotiation of the post-Cotonou 
agreement, which aims to deepen the Cotonou’s acquis. While environmental concerns in 
the EU-Africa relation often fall under the radar of scientific literature, this paper aims to 
show how the prism of environmental and climate mainstreaming helps in explaining the 
declining relevance of the post-Cotonou framework. Even though a rhetoric of a ‘deepened 
partnership’ became the leitmotiv of post-Cotonou, ‘far reaching’ environmental provisions 
in the future agreement are impeded by structural deficiencies. This reflects in post-
Cotonou’s current draft, trying hard to push environmental ambitions but maintaining a 
‘coherence’ between regional protocols that is detrimental to any real environmental 
mainstreaming progresses. A ‘greener’ post-Cotonou will be achieved only if references to 
other external policies are made due to the progressive ‘externalisation’ of Cotonou’s 
original pillars: political dialogue, trade and development cooperation into other agreements 
reducing therefore post-Cotonou’s added-value to a minimal.  
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At a time where the European Union and African countries are negotiating the future of their 
relationship through the post-Cotonou Agreement, critics are raising an essential point: is 
post-Cotonou still the right way to go? The Cotonou Agreement, signed in 2000, is a prime 
example of the “special relationship”1 that ties the European Union (EU) with the Africa-
Caribbean-Pacific group (ACP). Emerging from colonial ties, Cotonou builds on a 
succession of agreements that developed in parallel to the European integration’s history.  
Even by its critics, the Cotonou framework was recognised as “today’s most 
comprehensive North–South partnership” 2  covering three essential pillars: political 
dialogue, trade and development cooperation. It became even more salient in 2018 when the 
official launch of the negotiation for an agreement post-Cotonou started. The European 
Commission (EC) recognised the role of “a changed context” as an element to be considered 
when reflecting on a more than half a century long relationship, hindering “a simple rollover 
of the [Cotonou Agreement]”.3 
Moreover, the role of environmental degradation and climate change in developing 
countries was increasingly recognised for its political and economic consequences after it 
gained momentum in multilateral forums under the banner of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Furthermore, the environmental is a shared 
competency of the EU under article 4 of the Lisbon Treaty, which added to the 
mainstreaming obligation of environment into all the EU policies under article 11 TFEU. 
Additionally, the political momentum gained by the ‘climate question’ also had influence on 
the Cotonou framework, and its 2010 revision explicitly included climate change among 
                                                 
1 Adrian Flint, “The End of a 'special Relationship'? The New EU-ACP Economic Partnership Agreements”, 
Review of African Political Economy, vol. 36, no. 119, 2009, p. 80. 
2 Niels Keijzer and Mario Negre, “Outsourcing a partnership? Assessing ACP–EU cooperation under the 
Cotonou Partnership Agreement”, South African Journal of International Affairs, vol. 21, no. 2, 2014, p. 279. 
3 European Commission, Joint communication to the European Parliament and the Council. A renewed 
partnership with the countries of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, JOIN(2016) 52 final, Strasbourg, 22 
November 2016. p. 4. 
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priorities for action, with arguable results.4 Since then, the legally binding Paris Agreement 
has been signed in 2015 by all the African and European parties.  
Considering all these developments, the post-Cotonou negotiation has been launched 
under the rhetoric of a “renewed partnership”.5 It is composed of the Foundation, laying 
down the cross-cutting priorities and the values upon which the agreement is based, and of 
three regional protocols. The protocols are at the centre of the future agreement and 
constitute the operational basis for the future agreement.  
Most analyses centred on the role of migration and the political conditionality in 
Cotonou and the post-Cotonou.6 The study of environment and climate, overwhelmed by the 
aforementioned topics (especially in the case of Africa), catches little attention. For that 
reason, the environment is an interesting lens to look through in order to better understand 
the inscription of post-Cotonou in the overall African-EU relationship and its difficulty to 
catch up with recent policy evolutions. How does the environmental prism helps explain the 
declining relevance of the post-Cotonou framework? 
Theoretical framework: 
In order to evaluate from different angles the post-Cotonou negotiation  through an 
environmental focus, I  use several theories that complement each other. In order to evaluate 
from different angles the post-Cotonou negotiation with an environmental perspective, I use 
several theories that complement each other. The concept of ‘environmental integration’ is 
essential throughout the paper. Dupont defines a high level of Environmental Policy 
Integration (EPI) as the “incorporation of environmental objectives into all stages of 
                                                 
4 Cécile Barbière, “L’accord de Cotonou a-t-il tenu ses promesses ?”, Euractiv, 27 August 2018, retrieved 25 
April 2019, https://www.euractiv.fr/section/aide-au-developpement/news/laccord-de-cotonou-a-t-il-tenu-ses-
promesses/ 
5 European Commission, JOIN(2016) 52 final, op. cit.,p. 1. 
6 “The Cotonou Agreement – what will happen next?”, CONCORD¸ 31 July 2017, retrieved 3 March 2019, 
https://concordeurope.org/blog/2017/07/31/cotonou-negotiations-position/ 
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policymaking in non-environmental policy sectors, with a specific recognition of this goal 
as a guiding principle for the planning and execution of policy”. 7 Additionally, it must be: 
accompanied by an attempt to aggregate presumed environmental consequences 
into an overall evaluation of policy, and a commitment to minimise 
contradictions between environmental and sectoral policies by giving principled 
priority to the former over the latter.8  
 
One of the most important ideas to be taken from Dupont is that environmental 
integration first concerns a political prioritisation and its repercussion on the entire policy 
cycle. Therefore, evaluating the environmental ‘integration’ in the post-Cotonou means that 
a higher benchmark is achieved with regards to the ‘principled priority’ of environment in 
policy design and output. ‘Policy design’ mainly refers to the negotiating process that led to 
the mandate and the draft, whereas ‘policy output’ refers to the outcome of the negotiation 
i.e. the mandate and the draft text. A second essential point is the linkage between degrees 
of ‘integration’ and policy coherence. This means that prioritisation means a high degree of 
integration only if coherence is ensured.  
Carbone and Orbie identify four types of coherence: horizontal, vertical, multilateral 
and partners.9 I leave aside multilateral coherence i.e. the EU’s relation with multilateral 
organisations.10 Horizontal coherence i.e. the synergy between the different EU policies11 is 
of essential importance when assessing the consistency of the post-Cotonou with recent 
development of Africa-EU policies outside the post-Cotonou framework. Vertical coherence 
refers to the interaction between the supra-national level and the Member States,12 which 
                                                 
7 Dupont, op. cit., p. 32. 
8 Ibid.  
9  Maurizio Carbone and Jan Orbie, “Beyond Economic Partnership Agreements: EU and the trade-
development nexus”, in: Maurizio Carbone, Jan Orbie (eds.), The Trade-Development Nexus in the EU, 
Routledge, 2015, p.4. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
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will help in explaining the debates that led to the adoption of the EU mandate. Finally, the 
question of partners coherence, i.e. the EU’s consistency when interacting with partner 
developing countries,13 will bring added value to the analysis of the ‘path dependency’ 
effects impacting the ACP-EU relationship and the struggle to involve the African Union in 
the negotiation. 
My main sources are legal texts, negotiating mandates and interviews, due to the 
ongoing nature of the political process examined. Various institutional papers are also used 
to provide background elements. Overall, I conducted close to twenty interviews with actors 
from civil society, the European Commission (several Directorate-General), the European 
Parliament and from the Council. First, a textual analysis of the evolution of the original 
Cotonou in terms of environment integration helps in having a closer look at the negotiating 
mandates (ACP and the EU) and at a technical draft of the agreement. This raises points on  
the (in)consistency of the new approach to bring in a ‘greener’ post-Cotonou. Next, the paper 
explains how the negotiations in the Council, the mandate the Commission elaborated from 
it, and the fight between the African Union and the ACP secretariat over the lead negotiator 
for Africa on post-Cotonou, shaped the inconsistency. Finally, I analyse the progressive 
‘externalisation’ of each of three pillars from the original Cotonou in other policies, namely 
the Joint EU-Africa Strategy, the Economic Partnership Agreements, and the 
Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) and its 
consequences on post-Cotonou’s environmental ambitions. 
 
  
                                                 
13 Ibid. 
5 
 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSES OF THE CURRENT COTONOU AND THE POST-
COTONOUR AGREEMENTS: A STRONG TEXTUAL INTEGRATION? 
The Cotonou agreement was concluded in June 2000 and entered into force in 2003.14 It 
includes general objectives, principles and options for the future EU-ACP relations15 and is 
structured in three pillars: political dialogue, trade and development cooperation. It contains 
a revision clause to be triggered every 5 years, leading to two revisions in 2005 and 2010. In 
order to understand the ‘special’ nature of Cotonou, it is useful to recall that it constitutes an 
association agreement, governed by article 217 TFEU.  
From Cotonou 2000 to Cotonou 2010: a progressive greening 
From the 2000 version to the 2010 version, the general architecture of the agreement 
remained the same. Most of the amendments were done to articles themselves, mainly by 
adding sub-articles and elements that have an environmental focus. 
Overall, the 2000 version is quite comprehensive with regards to environmental 
provisions in the cooperation or integration clauses. Sinou notes that the original Cotonou 
Agreement is the most blatant example of a new reading of political conditionality for the 
environment.16 But it is not the case. The environment is part of the political dialogue (in 
article 8 paragraph 3). It means that even if the political dialogue must help promote 
environment, it is not considered an “essential element” 17  that can trigger sanction 
procedures included in Cotonou under article 96. 
                                                 
14 Official Journal of the European Communities, “Partnership Agreement between the members of the African, 
Caribbean and Pacific Group of States of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, 
of the other part, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000”, L 317/3, 2000. (Cotonou 2000) 
15 Gracia Marín Durán and Elisa Morgera, Environmental Integration in the EU's External Relations : Beyond 
Multilateral Dimensions, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2012, p. 83.. 
16 Despina Sinou, « Le droit répressif de l’environnement et l’alternative diplomatique ou hard law vs. soft 
law : le cas de l’Union européenne », Revue juridique de l’environnement, vol. 43, issue 1, 2018, p. 84. 
17 Cotonou 2000, Art. 9. 
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This leads to the important idea of environmental mainstreaming explicitly 
mentioned first in the general objectives of the partnership in the article 1 and then in article 
20 paragraph 2.18 The important priority it constitutes is consistent with the fundamental ex-
art 6 of the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC) and current article 11 TFUE 
“Environmental protection requirements must be integrated into the definition and 
implementation of the Union's policies and activities, in particular with a view to promoting 
sustainable development”.19  
The mainstreaming objective is restated in the only article of the Cotonou 2000 that 
specifically focuses on environment, article 32 “environment and natural resources”. Sinou 
writes of a “holistic approach”20 with regard to the link that is made in the article between 
sustainable development and the environment.  
When it comes to sectorial integration in environmental integration clauses - the 
integration of environment in other policy sectors (economic, etc.) 21 – the Cotonou 2000 is 
not really far-reaching. It is the full object however of an article on “trade and environment” 
(article 49), with an explicit reference to multilateral engagements and more detailed areas 
where trade and environment must operate in synergy, albeit without explicit goals or means 
of measurement stipulated either here or in the annexes.  
The Cotonou revision of 2005 made few environmental progresses. The Cotonou 
2010,22 however, is remarkable for its many amendments. In light of the changing global 
contexts, it tried to adapt to the global multiplication of actors by including provisions on 
regional organisations, taking into account the creation of the African Union in 2002, but 
                                                 
18 Cotonou 2000, Art. 20(2). 
19 Art 11. TFEU 
20 Sinou, op. cit., p. 84. Author’s translation. 
21 Marín Durán and Morgera op. cit., p. 56. 
22 European Commission Directorate-General for Development and Cooperation, L'accord De Cotonou, Signé 
À Cotonou Le 23 Juin 2000, Révisé́ À Luxembourg Le 25 Juin 2005, Révisé́ À Ouagadougou Le 22 Juin 2010 
Et Le Cadre Financier Pluriannuel 2014-2020, Luxembourg, 2014. (Cotonou 2010) 
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also regional cooperation in Africa (ECOWAS, etc.). The consequences of these new actors’ 
emergence will be addressed in the next point. It marked the essential integration of climate 
change in the text, reflecting a political impetus in domestic and multilateral fora that 
progressively prioritised climate change. Cotonou was indeed revised right after the failure 
of the Conference Of Parties (COP) 15 in Copenhagen and while preparing the COP 17 in 
Durban. The Cotonou revision of 2010 “should be singled out for its approach to 
environment protection as a thematic and cross-cutting issue”.23 
Numerous climate change references have been added in this version. For instance, 
the revised article 20 integrate climate change under the thematic and cross-cutting themes 
to be mainstreamed24 and the article 32A on climate change.25 A novelty of importance is 
the reference to the article 1 and 20 with an inter-regional approach26 This accounts for the 
progressive shift from the all-encompassing ACP approach to the differentiated approach 
that is the basis of the current post-Cotonou mandate and led to the debate on the design of 
the mandate developed above.27 
Therefore, Cotonou as an association agreement achieved a relatively comprehensive 
and new acquis on which to build a greener partnership. When comparing it with the Central 
America Association Agreement, for instance, it “seems ground-breaking”.28  
                                                 
23 Durán and Morgera, op. cit., p. 85. 
24 Cotonou 2010, op. cit, Art. 20(2). 
25 Ibid., Art. 32(a) and (d) ii. 
26 Ibid., Art. 28(2) c. 
27 The African Union and regional organisations of the ACP are mentioned on several occasions in the Cotonou 
2010. 
28 Durán and Morgera, op. cit., p. 95. 
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The EU and the ACP mandates: textual analysis 
This section casts a preliminary light on the reasons path dependency effects and 
incoherence (horizontal and partners coherence) impeded the post-Cotonou greening 
ambitions through the progressive externalisation of Cotonou’s pillars.  
A strong debate in the Council on whether to keep or not the ACP structure led to a 
compromise 29  that de facto rendered the present ACP mandate obsolete. The ACP 
mandate’s30 overall architecture is based on the original 3 pillars of Cotonou, referred to as 
“thematic strategic pillars”: aid, trade and political cooperation. It also contains a “cross-
cutting themes” umbrella part that sets the priorities in “development programme and 
policies”. 31 Three of the cross-cutting themes are directly addressing environmental issues 
and could show greater political prioritisation than in the original Cotonou, where only 
articles were raising the issue. However, in the theme’s content the phrasing is relatively 
disappointing and predictable: not a single point focuses on environment nor biodiversity. 
When it comes to environmental integration clauses, the word “environment” is not  
referred to a single time in the ‘development’ and ‘political dialogue’ pillars. Although 
“climate” is mentioned, it is not singled out and mostly referred to in enumerations, or in the 
specific case of poorest countries.  
The main criticism the mandate received originates not in its (lack of) environmental 
ambitions but mostly on its complacency with the status quo. It barely acknowledges the role 
of the African Union or Regional Economic Communities (RECs).32 Moreover, the ACP 
                                                 
29 Interview with a policy officer from DG DEVCO, Brussels, 18 March 2018. The point is developed in the 
next section. 
30 ACP Secretariat, Mandat de Négociation ACP sur un Accord de Partenariat Post-Cotonou avec l’Union 
Européenne  Lomé, ACP/00/O11/18 FINAL, 30 May 2018. (ACP Mandate). The mandate is in French, all the 
quotes are translated by the author. 
31 Ibid., paragraph 125. 
32 Geert Laporte, “The ACP group and the African Union in the post-Cotonou negotiations: Survival of the 
fittest?”, ECDPM blog, 25 June 2018, retrieved 17 April 2019, https://ecdpm.org/talking-points/acp-group-
african-union-post-cotonou-negotiations-survival-fittest/ 
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mandate gives a prominent role to aid and commitment of ‘predictable’ financial resources. 
Climate and environmental issues are directly linked to it.33 But, more than an ambitious 
phrasing that accounts for an awareness in the ACPs of their vulnerability to climate and 
environmental degradation,34 it rests on a ‘donor-recipient’ approach  that is outside of the 
EU agenda since at least Cotonou 2010. 
At the same time, the mandate does not really acknowledge the importance of climate 
change and the environment aside from vague and broad phrasing that are actually less far- 
reaching than the Cotonou acquis itself. It appears obsolete when compared with the recent 
evolution of the EU-African partnership, “a conservative document, unfit for a world post-
2020”.35 
A well-documented effect of the EU’s mandate adoption is the effect it has on its 
negotiating partners who do not have a large margin of negotiation, especially in the case of 
aid recipients like the ACPs.36 The EU mandate adopted on 21 June 2018 significantly 
deviates from the original Cotonou framework, while at the same time maintaining the ACP-
EU relationship at the centre of the negotiation. This translates in the original architecture 
described in the introduction.  
The Foundation is a part of the negotiated text that made large progress. EU 
negotiators actually pushed for a phrasing they see as a “strong” manner of stating the values 
the cooperation is based on.37 In DEVCO and the EEAS, the essential idea when it comes to 
the Foundation section is essentially to restate the EU and ACP international engagements 
                                                 
33 ACP Negotiating Mandate, paragraph 7. 
34 Interviewees at DG ENV and DEVCO confirmed the awareness on the ACP side. 
35 Laporte, op. cit. 
36  Tom Delreux, “Multilateral Environmental Agreements: a key instrument of global environmental 
governance”, in: Camilla Adelle, Katja Biedenkopf and Diarmuid Torney (eds.), European Union External 
Environmental Policy. Rules, Regulation and Governance Beyond Borders, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 
2018, p. 31. 
37 Interview with a policy officer from DG DEVCO, op. cit. 
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and the Cotonou acquis whilst trying to push for more environmental integration. 38 
Important changes can be observed in the mandate compared to the 2010 Cotonou, most 
importantly title IV on “environmental sustainability, climate change and sustainable 
resources” has been added, and is found in the “strategic priority”.39 In comparison with the 
two environmental articles (article 32 and 32A) of Cotonou, it constitutes a significant 
political step in the sense of an environmental prioritisation. A technical draft 40 of this 
specific Title was obtained as it was used during the ACP-EU senior officials meeting on 15 
March 2019. Therefore, my analysis will use both the draft and the mandate. 
Title IV in the mandate recalls the international commitment of both parties, namely 
the Paris Agreement and SDGs.41 Its generally incentive vocabulary reflects in the technical 
draft of the Title IV (renamed “Environmental sustainability and climate change” from the 
mandate) through four chapters: environmental sustainability; oceans, seas and marine 
resources; climate change; and natural disasters. 42  The text is not specific but highly 
exhaustive and far more detailed than the 2010 Cotonou and the view of DG DEVCO on a 
“strong legal wording”43 is visible. Certain issues remain in brackets and will be developed 
later. The draft is not revolutionary, however, it essentially restate points of Cotonou with 
additional elements. Implementation details is the role the regional protocols. 
In order to prevent à la carte effects if environmental prioritisation were too different 
between each protocols, the Commission officially tried to maintain cohesion between the 
pillars. However, this created horizontal incoherence between policies. Indeed, the 
environment and climate chapters in the three protocols are literally a copy-paste of each 
                                                 
38 Interview with a policy officer from DG ENV, Brussels, 4 April 2019. 
39 Council of the European Union, Negotiating directives for a Partnership Agreement between the European 
Union and its Member States of the one part, and with countries of the African, Caribbean and Pacific 
Group of States of the other part, 8094/18 ADD1, Brussels, 21 June 2018, (EU Negotiating Mandate), p. 19. 
40 Meeting CNG level, Technical draft, 14 March 2019. 
41 EU Negotiating Mandate, op. cit., p. 19. 
42 The document is not public and cannot be quoted here. 
43 Interview with a policy advisor from the post-Cotonou Task Force, Skype interview, 11 April 2019. 
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other.44 Only one or two sentences are changed that relates to specific regional problems. 
While not much is yet disclosed on the exact content of the protocols, the main idea of the 
Commission is – as previously mentioned – to make them technical and very specific.45 The 
exact opposite happens here. Additionally, the draft protocols 46  veered far from their 
operational purpose. From a critical perspective, it actually creates an inherent inconsistency 
in the mandate itself, as the coherence advocated by the EU officials potentially undermines 
in itself the principle of differentiation that is at the basis of the protocols. 
 
AN INTRICATE NEGOTIATING PROCESS UNDERMINING POST-COTONOU 
ENVIRONMENTAL AMBITIONS  
The EU’s position in the negotiation: cohesiveness and path dependency 
As expected, the most publicized controversies of the EU-ACP partnership related 
to debates around migration that arose in the preparation of the mandate. Though not related 
to environmental issues, these oppositions are an introduction to the very divided approach 
that prevailed in the ACP Working Party of the Council when internal negotiations on post-
Cotonou first started in 2015.  
Indeed, following discussions that took place in 2015 and 2016, a compromise was 
found on a quite difficult question: should we maintain the ACP group and the ACP 
Secretariat? The ACP Secretariat, created following the Georgetown Agreement in 1975, is 
highly dependent on the EU. Its operational budget is partially provided by the EU under the 
European Development Fund (EDF) and is therefore dependant on European funds. In the 
                                                 
44 See EU Negotiating Mandate, op. cit., p. 43-47; 50-55; 65-71. 
45 Interview with a policy officer from DG DEVCO, op. cit. 
46 Although I do not have any written version in our possession the Caribbean and Pacific draft were shown to 
me during an interview.  
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Council, the debate on whether or not to keep the ACP took place in early 2015.47 A number 
of countries, among which Germany, the Nordic Countries and Eastern countries, were in 
favour of separate agreements with Africa, Caribbean and the Pacific regions outside of the 
ACP framework. On the other hand, countries like France, Spain and the UK wanted to keep 
the ACP structure.48 The countries that wanted to get rid of the ACP group broadly constitute 
the Members States that joined the EU after the Cold War, and the countries with no ‘special’ 
interests in Africa. 49 In the European Parliament (EP) – that has low powers over the 
negotiation process – the conclusion of the mandate was not at all controversial.50 Only the 
Greens opposed the mandate because they wanted the dissolution of the ACP group due to 
its perceived lack of relevance. 
The bloc against the ACP expressed the idea that the proven added value of the ACP 
secretariat was weak. Germany for instance, through the German Agency for International 
Cooperation (GIZ), stated that the future of the partnership could only be regional, in the 
form of a partnership with continental Africa.51  
Among the countries in favour of the ACP group, an ‘environmental’ argument from 
the French government found support. For French negotiators, the ACP still is a relevant 
assembly because they strongly collaborated with the EU during the negotiation of the Paris 
Agreement. 52  Therefore, the ACP group might be a basis for a viable partnership in 
Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs). This combination of strategic interests – 
having more influence in multilateral settings – with a normative approach – the EU capacity 
                                                 
47 Tina Tindermans and Dirk Brems, “Post-Cotonou: Preliminary positions of EU Member States”, EDPM, 
Briefing Note, no. 87, February 2016, p. 1. 
48 Interview with a senior expert from DG TRADE, phone interview, 11 April 2019. 
49 Interview with a German delegate to the ACP Working Party, op. cit. 
50 Interview with two parliamentary assistants, op. cit. 
51 Tancrède Voituriez et al., “Les relations entre l’UE et les pays d’Afrique, Caraïbes et Pacifique (ACP) après 
2020”, IDDRI, Issue Brief n. 3, February 2018, p. 3. 
52 Maina Waruru, “Are Africa’s climate negotiators ready for COP24?”, 4 September 2018, retrieved 03 May 
2019, https://www.equaltimes.org/are-africa-s-climate-negotiators?lang=en#.XMyRdKTgo2x 
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to be a normative leader –succeeded in the Council. 53 Clearly showing its impact, the 
argument is directly restated in the post-Cotonou impact assessment from the Commission 
of November 2016.54  
Indeed, the impact assessment screened a number of possible outcomes for the post-
Cotonou agreement:55 
• Option 1. No partnership 
• Option 2. New partnership with ACP countries 
- Option 2.1 Revised common agreement (all ACP countries) 
- Option 2.2: Separate regional agreements (Africa, Caribbean and the Pacific) 
- Option 2.3: Three separate regional partnerships under a common umbrella. 
The document analyses the different consequences these options could have on five 
specific objectives, among which environmental protection and climate change.56 As regards 
environmental objectives, the two first options are rejected on the basis of the low critical 
mass it would give in MEAs.57  
However, the Commission has greater difficulty in rejecting options 2.2 (the German 
bloc’s position in the Council) and option 2.3 (France’s bloc). It seems not farfetched to see 
here an example of a sort of institutional path dependency in the relationship, expressed 
though environmental considerations. Among two options, a continuity-based one clearly 
was preferred by the Council actors over one whose outcome was difficult to evaluate due 
                                                 
53 Interview with a German delegate to the ACP Working Party, op. cit. 
54 European Commission, Joint staff working document. Impact assessment, SWD(2016) 380 final, Strasbourg, 
22 November 2016, p. 54. 
55 Ibid. p. 31-32. 
56 Ibid., p. 54. 
57 Ibid., p. 55. 
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to its novelty.58 The difficulty in justifying the choice raises the point of the horizontal 
incoherence – an inconsistency between the multiple policy engagement of the EU with 
Africa – that the compromise mandate failed to address.  
At the same time as the Commission published the impact assessment, it also released 
a “Joint communication to the European Parliament and the Council” that proposed a new 
architecture of the agreement. The architecture is the one found in the mandate and 
developed in the previous section. From a number of divergent voices, the EU came up with 
a consensual position among Member States that was able to become the basis on the post-
Cotonou negotiation. However, in reaching cohesiveness, the EU consolidated the path of 
its long term asymmetrical relationship with the ACP in an quasi-unchanged way.59  
Another important latent element in the negotiation and in the perception of the EU 
negotiators is the negotiating predictability of the ACP ambassadors. On one hand, the ACP 
ambassadors have a weak mandate, which mean that they must refer every development in 
the negotiation to their government, slowing down the process. On the other hand, EU 
officials are capable of predicting the behaviour of their counterparts. Of course, it has a 
strong impact on the path-dependency that characterises the negotiation. Even if not explicit 
or intentional, it also places the EU negotiators in a very strong position, which could be an 
additional explanation for the maintaining of the ACP structure. These processes are clearly 
evidenced in the case of contentious environmental points in the current negotiation. 
                                                 
58 Evidently, a number of other non-environmental arguments played out in the Council. However they all 
equally retain this ‘path-dependency’ factor.   
59 Keijzer and Bartels, op. cit., p. 9. 
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Contentious environmental points in the negotiation  
The Task Force currently is in the middle of the negotiating process: the second round 
of negotiation concluded on 4 April 2019.60 The first round ended the 14 December 2018. 61 
At the time, only the agenda of the negotiation had been agreed upon. A reason for that is 
that the EU mandate was effectively imposed on the ACP negotiating team of ambassadors. 
After preliminary talks, the former had to head back to their respective countries to ask for 
more instructions in light of the new architecture proposed by the EU team. This helps one 
understand the very different cohesion and negotiation power of both teams, hence their 
different margins of action in the political process.62  
In the meantime, the regional protocols are being drafted by the EU. The capacity of 
the Commission to secure internally a draft through inter-DG consultations that already 
predicts the negotiating party positions is highly important in the day-to-day conduct of the 
negotiation. 
While articles 8, 96 and 97 of the Cotonou that lay down the basis of the political 
dialogue procedure are the most debated 63  some environmental points found in the 
Foundation part of post-Cotonou are disputed. Specific examples can be taken from the 
technical draft mentioned above.  They will be discussed in light of the outcome of the AU-
ACP senior meeting that took place on the 15 March around the Title IV of the Foundation 
on environment and climate.64 
                                                 
60 European Commission, Press release: European, African, Caribbean and Pacific countries conclude second 
round of talks on a new ambitious partnership, Brussels, 4 April 2019. 
61 European Commission, Press release: EU and ACP countries conclude first round of negotiations to 
modernise their relations, Brussels, 14 December 2018. 
62 Tom Delreux, “EU actorness, cohesiveness and effectiveness in environmental affairs”, Journal of European 
Public Policy, vol. 21, issue 7, 2014, p.1020. 
63 Interview with an officer on Africa from the French Permanent Representation, phone interview, 29 March 
2019. 
64 Meeting CNG level, op. cit. 
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The ACP ambassadors pushed for the inclusion of two long lists of specific 
engagements that will have to be implemented by the parties (in the “climate” and “ocean 
governance” articles). In opposition, the Task Force deploys a very strict reading of the 
Foundation. For them, all these points will have to be deleted or placed in the protocol.65 As 
mentioned earlier, the mandate designed the geographic protocols as the practical and 
technical part of the agreement, and the Foundation as a common value part. Therefore, the 
Foundation uses broad and general wording overall. Following the meeting of 15 March 
2019 between EU and ACP senior officials, the listing of operational clauses, have been 
relocated in the regional protocols. However, the move is not reassuring as the protocols are 
more or less a copy-paste of each other. 
The difficulties in negotiating the exact content of the environmental part of the 
Foundation could be related to the incoherence that was found back in the drafting phase of 
the mandate. The ACP is trying to secure a common Foundation that will retain some specific 
and precise elements because it wants to defend a common ACP approach that the protocols 
are challenging. On the other hand, the Task Force negotiates with a partner it knows to be 
only reactive and progressively irrelevant. This contradiction and the mixed signals it gives 
is the reason for the ‘partners’ and ‘horizontal incoherence’ identified in the conduct of the 
negotiation, in the mandate and in the draft. 
The conflict between the ACP and the African Union: consequences on the greening 
ambition of post-Cotonou   
Now moving on to the African side, this section focuses on the conflict between the 
African Union and the ACP secretariat over the most legitimate organisation to lead the 
                                                 
65 Interview with a policy officer from DG DEVCO, op. cit. 
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negotiation of the two. A major difficulty here is that both actually include the same African 
states in their respective structure.   
The conflict gained momentum prior to the negotiation. Both the African Union and 
the ACP are facing criticism of lacking a mandate. In turn, this has important consequences 
on the architecture of the agreement: the EU had difficulties to work a way to include these 
two actors, which has repercussions on the coherence of the EU mandate. The EU’s path-
dependent stance when approaching the negotiation reflects a real difficulty in identifying – 
and acknowledging – the right interlocutor to talk to from the African side.66 Further, it 
impeded on the difficulty of post-Cotonou to be far-reaching and bear environmental 
ambitions.  
The discord between the African Union and the ACP manifested openly through 
several events. First, the African Union published a “Common African Position” after the 
18th Session of its executive Council in Kigali on the 19 of March 2018.67 The document 
states: “we commit to implement a new cooperation framework with the EU outside the 
ACP context” [emphasis added]. 68  The AU then proposed the Comity of Permanent 
Representatives as the negotiating leaders for Africa, casting out the ACP group. 69 
Notwithstanding, the ACP group ignored this and adopted its mandate on 30 May 2018. In 
it, the ACP group implicitly opposes the AU and clearly states its ambition of being “the 
leading transcontinental organisation (…) through South-South and North-South 
cooperation.”70 The ACP group’s position (in practice the secretariat) is not willing to renew 
the EU-African partnership but to increase its influence and importance.71  
                                                 
66 Laporte, op. cit. 
67 African Union, Négociations pour un nouvel accord de coopération avec l’Union Européenne l’accord post-
2020. Position Commune Africaine, Kigali, 18th session of the Executive Council, 19 March 2018. 
68 Ibid., paragraph 15. 
69 Ibid., paragraph 15(e) ii. 
70 See ACP Negotiating Mandate, op. cit., point 16 and Geert Laporte, op. cit. 
71 Voituriez, op. cit., p. 3. 
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Formally, however, the African Union was not given the negotiating mandate by the 
African countries. They picked the ACP and its council of ambassadors who are basically 
national ambassadors. Yet, the AU sent the Professor Carlos Lopez as their High 
Representative to support the ACP’s African ambassadors in the negotiation of the post-
Cotonou.72 The AU still calls for a separate African negotiation process, even if it no longer 
explicitly opposes the ACP lead.73  
On the other hand, the ACP structure is disconnected from its African basis and 
largely ignored by African governments. 74  This clearly impedes on the credibility and 
legitimacy of the ACP secretariat.75 Since its creation in 1975, the ACP group has widened 
in terms of Member States but it has not deepened its ties or legitimacy.76 On the African 
Union side, the AU had tremendous difficulties in receiving a clear mandate from its 
Member States.77 Observers generally conclude that distrust from African governments of 
AU’s desire to gain more power by having a more prominent role through the negotiation.78  
In the end, the ACP will formally remain the negotiator in charge even for the 
geographic protocol, in particular in the case of Caribbean and Pacific countries. However, 
the AU will probably be included in the negotiation of the African protocol. The AU 
accepted from the start of the negotiation – after the dispute mentioned above – to provide 
technical support to the ACP. Yet, they were not asked to participate in the Foundation but 
only in the redaction of the African pillar. 
                                                 
72 Alfonso Medinilla and Jean Bossuyt, “Africa-EU relations and post-Cotonou: African collective action or 
further fragmentation of partnerships?”, ECDPM, Briefing Note no. 110, p. 3. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Keijzer and Negre, op. cit., p. 279. 
75 Interview with an officer on Africa and an officer on the ACP from the French Permanent Representation, 
op. cit. 
76 Carbone, op. cit., p. 750. 
77 Alexei Jones, Lidet Tadesse and Philomena Apiko, “Continental drifts in a multipolar world”, ECDPM, 
Challenges For Africa-Europe Relations, January 2019, p. 2. 
78 Ibid., p. 3. 
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The mandate was not given to the AU by African countries for similar reasons. The 
ACP is a much more convenient institution to endorse for the precise reason that it does not 
have a strong agency. Most of the African States are a bit fearful, in turn, to give away too 
much power to the AU in the promotion of their national interests.79 
As explained above, the post-Cotonou negotiation is embedded in a long relationship 
of asymmetry. The recognition of the ACP structure as the negotiating partner for Africa is 
a continuation of that heritage. In terms of environmental integration, this has the main 
consequence of fostering a relative status quo approach. The ACP ambassadors have weak 
mandates that do not allow them to push for environmental ambitions, and the ACP 
secretariat is ill-suited to advance progress in that field.  
Therefore, the AU’s potential inclusion in the design of the African protocol is 
interesting regarding the outcome and the potential scope and reach of the text’s 
environmental ambitions. Although the organisation will probably only have an observatory 
role, it might bring in some debate.  
 
EXTERNALISED DIMENSIONS OF THE COTONOU AGREEMENT: 
CONSEQUENCES ON ENVIRONMENTAL INTEGRATION POST-COTONOU 
Introduction to the pillars’ externalisation 
The EU has long regionalised most of its cooperation with Africa on trade, security 
or migration, but the most relevant levels are the continental, regional or bilateral one, not 
the ACP.80 This section discusses the extent to which the pillars of the original Cotonou have 
been ‘externalised’ and the consequences it poses on the greening possibilities in the current 
negotiation. By ‘externalised’, pillars of the original Cotonou, for which detailed procedures 
                                                 
79 Medinilla and Bossuyt, op. cit., p. 4. 
80 Medinilla and Bossuyt, op. cit., p. 2. 
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were laid down in the annexes, were progressively taken away from it and are now designed 
through other frameworks. The process will be successively exemplified in the case of the 
political cooperation, the trade and the aid pillars. 
The JAES: a progressive replacement of the Cotonou framework for a more targeted climate 
and environmental action? 
In its 2016 impact assessment, the Commission acknowledges the incapacity of the 
current Cotonou agreement to follow institutional agreements signed with the ACP since 
2000.  
The current [Cotonou Agreement] settings, based on a single agreement without 
regional diversification, would also ingenerate further inconsistencies with 
respect to the different regional priorities and objectives as defined in 
Africa, Caribbean and the Pacific. On the one hand, in fact, the 2007 Joint 
Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) has given significant prominence to political aspects 
(notably peace and security, migration) and sustainable development 81 
[emphasis added] 
 
The reason for change is found in the ongoing trend in EU-African relations that 
relates to changing world politics and governance.82 For instance, the growing influence of 
China in Africa is perceived by the EU as a threat and forces a change in strategy by the 
Western countries, manifested in the perceived need to engage more bilaterally with African 
states. Arguably, the engagement in the JAES in 2007, and the overlap it creates with the 
Cotonou framework, partially stems from this urgency. 
Even though it is still under negotiation, the Commission envisages the Joint Africa-
EU Strategy as the basis for the African protocol. The JAES was adopted during the Lisbon 
Summit in 2007 and aims at reinforcing the political dialogue in several key areas (migration, 
                                                 
81 European Commission, Joint staff working document. Impact assessment, op. cit., p. 26 
82 Interview with a policy officer on Africa from ECDPM, op. cit. 
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security, climate and environment) between the EU and the AU through regular action plans. 
Some argue it de facto replaces the Cotonou as an all-encompassing agreement. Following 
its adoption in 2007, it became the new overarching political framework for the EU-African 
relations,83 and  the objectives of Cotonou and the JAES show similar goals.84 
For others, the Cotonou and the JEAS are frameworks running in parallel, the 
difference being that Cotonou is a binding agreement.85 Still, the JAES as the basis for the 
African protocol could mean a potentially enhanced environmental commitment in the EU-
Africa relationship. Indeed, the JAES includes the Partnership on Climate Change and the 
Environment, 86  directly raising the profile of environmental integration. It is meant in 
particular as a way to enhance collaboration  in the international cooperation fora like the 
UNFCCC. Prior to the Paris Agreement, it led to a joint declarations in 2008 with the idea 
of the “Common But Differentiated Responsibility”. 87  One of the real commitments 
emerging from the environmental aspect is the European Commission to help the funding of 
the African Initiative on Renewable Energy (AREI).88  
But the instruments themselves have been remarkable for their low-level of 
implementation. A report on the JAES for the EP assesses the result of the environment and 
climate change as relatively poor. 89  A general criticism addressed to the JAES is its 
                                                 
83 Camilla Adelle and Simon Lightfoot, “Africa: searching for shared issues and overcoming asymmetries” in 
Camilla Adelle, Katja Biedenkopf and Diarmuid Torney (eds.), European Union External Environmental 
Policy. Rules, Regulation and Governance Beyond Borders, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2018, p. 254. 
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vol. 36, no. 1, 2016, p. 47. 
85  Jack Mangala, “Africa-EU strategic partnership: historical background, institutional architecture, and 
theoretical frameworks” in: Jack Mangala, Africa and the European Union : A Strategic Partnership, New 
York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, p. 18. 
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“securitisation” tendency, becoming a platform for security and migration discussion far 
more than an environmental one.90  
In environmental domains, beyond political declarations, it is unclear and doubtful 
how the framework developed by the JAES has been helpful in striking multilateral deals. 
In the COP, South Africa and the African Group of Negotiators played a bigger role outside 
the JAES framework.91 
In addition to the JAES, two other strategies and programs are envisaged as 
complements to the African protocol.92 The first is the Agenda 2063 of the African Union, 
the equivalent to the EU’s Agenda 2030, characterised by broad and incentive targets.93 The 
second is the the Africa–Europe Alliance for Sustainable Investment and Jobs that was 
adopted in 2018. The Alliance is mostly a partnership that aims at creating jobs for 
development and reducing migration, it does not integrate environment nor climate.94 The 
two additions therefore will have a doubtful advantage for the advance of environmental 
mainstreaming in post-Cotonou. The necessity to integrate the JAES in the Post Cotonou in 
order to avoid incoherence is an acknowledgement that the “political agreement”95 that is 
Cotonou has progressively been replaced and externalised. 
The progressive autonomy of the Economic Partnership Agreements via 
environmental integration 
Another important element that has been partially externalised is the trade pillar of 
Cotonou, specifically the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) consisting of trade 
                                                 
90 Adelle and Lightfoot, op. cit., p. 266. 
91 Ibid., p. 258. 
92 Interview with a policy advisor from the post-Cotonou Task Force, op. cit. 
93 African Union, Agenda 2063. The Africa we want, African Union Commission, popular edition, 2015.  
94 Interview with a policy officer from DG ENV, op. cit. 
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agreements with different regions of the ACP. 96 The EPAs mark the very criticised shift 
from non-reciprocal to reciprocal trade with the ACPs.  
The EPAs are at very different stages of advancement. There are currently seven 
EPAs, of which five are provisionally applied.97 Moreover, among the five, only two are 
final agreements, the CARIFORUM EPA (with Caribbean states) since 2008 and the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) EPA since 2016. Three of them are 
only bilateral agreements, provisionally applied. 
In theory, the EPAs are stand-alone agreements and would not require Cotonou to 
exist. 98 However, five of them actually need the Cotonou framework for environmental 
clauses (the cases of the CARIFORUM and the SADC EPA will be discussed below). 
In the interim and provisional EPAs, a system of cross-references is established 
between the EPAs and Cotonou to ensure that they can comply with human rights, labour, 
and environmental standards until they become full agreements. In the most blocked cases, 
the West African EPA and the East African Community (EAC) EPA, sustainable 
development (which covers environment) is part of a ‘rendez-vous’ clause. It means that the 
trade agreement will have to rely on Cotonou until they are signed by all parties, receive the 
European Parliament consent and then are ratified by all parties. The bilateral stepping-stone 
EPAs (Ivory Coast, Cameroon, Ghana) all contain an article 80 (article 106 in the Cameroon 
EPA) “Relationship with other agreements” stating the prevalence of Cotonou over the EPA 
in case of inconsistency. Article 49 of Cotonou on Trade and Environment, providing the 
basis of environmental and climate integration in trade practices, is therefore included. They 
                                                 
96 Other trade arrangement are applied a number of ACP countries, namely the Everything but Arms (32 
African countries currently) and the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP).  
97 Zamfir, op. cit., pp. 3-4. 
98 Keijzer and Bartels, op. cit., p. 13. 
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must be restated in the post-Cotonou for environmental provisions in the EPAs to be 
maintained.  
As it stands, the EPAs are going to be integrated in the post-Cotonou in the same 
manner they were included in Cotonou. Post-Cotonou will provide an update by including 
references to the most recent development in climate and environmental integration such as 
the Paris Agreement.99  
However, the development of the EU paradigm regarding trade policy makes it 
unlikely that the reference to Cotonou will always be required for environmental standards 
as the EU shifted paradigm after the publication of the Commission’s communication 
“Global Europe: Competing in the World” in 2006.100 This marked the beginning of Trade 
and Sustainable Development (TSD) chapters in EU trade agreements. These chapters focus 
on labour and environmental provisions and strongly insist on the commitment to 
Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs). 
In the case of the EPAs, the approach is noticeable. The two EPAs that are final and 
implemented (CARIFORUM and SADC EPAs) contain a TSD. The CARIFORUM EPA, 
because it was signed in 2008, contains an “early TSD”.101 On the other hand, chapter II of 
the SADC, signed in 2016, is named “Trade and Sustainable Development”. 102  Cross-
references to Cotonou are still found in the agreement, but they do not replace a 
comprehensive list of modalities for cooperation in environmental domains. The degree of 
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autonomy of the SADC towards the Cotonou is for that reason higher, to the extent that it 
does not need the post-Cotonou framework for environmental provisions. 
But the SADC EPA or the CARIFORUM will not be left as the only EPAs to include 
a TSD. The East and Southern Africa EPA is the older African EPA, in force since 2012. 
According to its ‘rendez-vous’ clause in article 53, it will undergo a revision or “deepening” 
by DG TRADE.103 Most of the other interim agreements are also, notwithstanding their 
interim status, effectively the basis of cooperation.104 At some point, therefore, they will 
undergo the same revision due to their respective ‘rendez-vous’ clause and have a TSD 
integrated, as it is the model approach of DG TRADE towards PTAs.  
All these elements confirm two things. First, that post-Cotonou will still be important 
for environmental provisions in EPAs. But second, its relevance is declining. Throughout 
the envisaged revisions of the EPAs, post-Cotonou will not be needed anymore as a 
framework. 
Externalising the EDF: the NDICI and greening perspectives 
 Historically, the ‘special’ relationship that distinguished the countries of the ACP 
group from other developing countries was anchored in development aid, provided by a 
tailor-made instrument: the  European Development Fund (EDF).105 The EDF still exists 
under the 2014-2020 MFF, and is one of the major geographic funding instrument.106 An 
important characteristic of the EDF is that it is a development fund outside the EU budget, 
directly financed by contributions from the Member States. Its legal basis and running 
                                                 
103 Interview with a senior expert from DG TRADE, op. cit. 
104 Ibid. 
105 Flint, op. cit., p. 80. 
106 “Funding instruments”, DG DEVCO website, retrieved 25 March 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/ 
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budget are defined directly in the Cotonou agreement. The Annex I, the “financial protocol”, 
of Cotonou 2000, 2005 and 2010 respectively set its amount. 
Thorough the years however, the special status of the fund was challenged by the 
new thematic funds that reflected the EU and ACP cooperation in the growing topic of 
climate change. The creation of the Global Public Goods and Challenges (GPGC) in 2014 is 
a reflection of these dynamics, and the Global Climate Change Alliance (GCCA) created in 
2007 (currently funded under the GPGC 2014-2020) 107  is another manifestation of a 
progressively externalised action that excludes de facto the EDF and Cotonou as the most 
relevant frameworks for environmental action. Nonetheless, the EDF remained pertinent 
under the current 2014-2020 budget as it included a mandatory obligation of having at least 
20% of climate-compatible spending for all areas of the EU budget that became a “general 
benchmark in EU development cooperation”108 and “the main source of leverage for climate 
and environmental policy integration”109 in development aid. 
But the recent proposal for the new EU budget is effectively making the EDF, and 
therefore the last pillar of Cotonou, fall. The 14 June 2018 the European Commission 
proposed a fundamental reform of the external aid mechanisms through a regulation for a 
new external aid instrument, the Neighbourhood, Development and International 
Cooperation Instrument (NDICI).110 As it stands at the moment, the NDICI merges all the 
external aid instruments  in a massive envelope of €89.2 billion. Of this, €32 billion will be 
devoted to sub-Saharan Africa.111 If adopted, the EDF will be suppressed, erasing the link 
between the EDF funds and the Cotonou framework.  
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Another fundamental element is the potential greening of the NDICI, currently 
debated between the Commission, the Parliament and some Members States including 
France and Germany. Under the new proposal, the Commission wants to raise the climate 
compatible spending to 25% in order to “contribute to mainstream climate action in the 
Union policies”.112 The Commission proposal is now undergoing the first reading of the 
Ordinary Legislative Procedure. It was first examined in the European Parliament by two 
committees, AFET and DEVE. The vote in committee took place the 4 March 2019 and was 
followed by the vote of the text in plenary the 27 March 2019. The EP amended recital 28 
and proposed in turn a much higher number:  
Actions under this Regulation are expected to contribute 45% of its overall 
financial envelope to climate objectives, environmental management and 
protection, biodiversity and combatting desertification, of which 30% of the 
overall financial envelope should be dedicated to climate change mitigation 
and adaptation.113  
 
The Council, in its partial mandate of 13 June 2019, set a lower contribution of 25% 
overall.114 The first trilogue will take place on 23 October 2019. While the main greening 
factor of the Africa-EU partnership was the greening of the aid that was governed in the 
post-Cotonou framework, it might now be voted under the Ordinary Legislative Procedure 
(OLP). 
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CONCLUSION 
As this paper demonstrates, institutional and policy evolutions make post-Cotonou 
progressively an obsolete framework and impede on its capacity to ‘green’ the EU-Africa 
relationship. 
The ongoing negotiating process builds on a clearly EU-ACP asymmetrical 
relationship, coupled with a ‘vertical incoherence’ of actors on the African side. The ‘à la 
carte’ nature of the compromise over African representatives reflects the institutional 
stickiness of the Cotonou framework and a path dependent relationship between the EU and 
the ACP structure. Renewal will be difficult under such terms. The last points of controversy 
that remains on environmental issues are likely to be traded for issues that are considered 
more important by the EU such as political conditionality, leading to a horizontal 
incoherence in the text. 
A ‘normative power’ discourse of the EU welcomes a far-reaching on environmental 
ambitions, as reflected in  the Foundation. However, the ‘à la carte’ architecture of the 
negotiation also reflects on the text itself, bringing in structural inconsistency. Indeed, the 
geographic protocols are supposed to become the implementation basis of post-Cotonou. 
However, a large copy-paste of environmental title from one region to another raises fear 
that such ambitions will be downgraded. 
The Protocols will likely come up empty on the environmental additions to the 
relationship because not much can be negotiated anymore. The original pillars of Cotonou 
(political dialogue, trade and development cooperation) have been progressively 
‘externalised’ in other agreements and strategies. These will be the real basis of the post-
Cotonou EU-African ‘greener’ relationship. On political dialogue, the JAES created a EU-
AU platform that largely overlapped with Cotonou. It might become a priori the basis for 
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the African protocol. Such a move raises environmental concerns, with a focus on security 
and migration issues progressively replacing environmental issues in the JAES.  
Trade, through the self-standing Economic Partnership Agreements, was clearly 
externalised. In that case however, post-Cotonou could still be relevant because no 
environmental provisions are found in these text. They are covered by references to the 
original Cotonou and its successor the post-Cotonou agreement. However, pursuant to their 
‘rendez-vous’ clause and ongoing developments, this might soon be an outdated situation. 
The revision of each EPA will be accompanied by the integration of Trade and Sustainable 
Development chapters (TSDs) in the agreements. Once it is done, the EPAs will truly 
become self-standing agreements and will not require post-Cotonou at all. 
Regarding development cooperation, while Cotonou was the legal basis for the EDF, 
the NDICI is voted under the Ordinary Legislative Procedure and offers aid to African 
countries without any requirement regarding post-Cotonou. Aid played an important role in 
‘greening’ the EU-African partnership under Cotonou and will still be the case after 2020, 
but without any need for the post-Cotonou whatsoever. Counterintuitively, a major 
‘greening’ factor of the EU-African relationship might emerge from the ongoing intra-EU 
negotiations over the environmental-compatible percentage of expenditures under the 
NDICI.  
As this paper explained, more than the inherent quality and scope of the text when it 
comes to greening provisions, it relates to the evolutions of the partnership, with Africa in 
particular. Externalisation effects might in fact bring environmental mainstreaming in the 
EU-Africa cooperation more effectively than the post-Cotonou text. Post-Cotonou will most 
likely become a “political agreement” – a declaration of good intentions – unable to push 
forward ambitions with regards to environment or climate. 
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ANNEX I: relevant extracts of the Cotonou Agreement (consolidated version) 
(Amendments following the 2005 and 2010 revisions are in bold letters). 
 
PREAMBLE 
(…) 
CONSIDERING that the Millennium Development Goals emanating from the Millennium 
Declaration adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 2000, in particular the 
eradication of extreme poverty and hunger, as well as the development targets and principles 
agreed in the United Nations Conferences, provide a clear vision and must underpin ACP–EC 
cooperation within this Agreement; acknowledging that the EU and the ACP States need 
to make a concerted effort to accelerate progress towards attaining the Millennium 
Development Goals; 
(…) 
AWARE of the serious global environmental challenge posed by climate change, and 
deeply concerned that the most vulnerable populations live in developing countries, in 
particular in Least Developed Countries and Small Island ACP States, where climate-
related phenomena such as sea level rise, coastal erosion, flooding, droughts and 
desertification are threatening their livelihoods and sustainable development; 
 
Article 1 
Objectives of the partnership 
 
(…) The principles of sustainable management of natural resources and the environment, 
including climate change, shall be applied and integrated at every level of the partnership. 
 
TITLE II 
THE POLITICAL DIMENSION 
Article 8 
Political dialogue 
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3. The dialogue shall cover all the aims and objectives laid down in this Agreement as well as 
all questions of common, general or regional interest, including issues pertaining to regional 
and continental integration. Through dialogue, the Parties shall contribute to peace, security 
and stability and promote a stable and democratic political environment. It shall encompass 
cooperation strategies, including the aid effectiveness agenda, as well as global and sectoral 
policies, including environment, climate change, gender, migration and questions related to 
the cultural heritage. It shall also address global and sectoral policies of both Parties that 
might affect the achievement of the objectives of development cooperation. 
PART 3  
COOPERATION STRATEGIES 
TITLE I  
DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES 
Article 20 
The Approach 
 
2. Systematic account shall be taken in mainstreaming into all areas of cooperation the 
following thematic or cross-cutting themes: human rights, gender issues, democracy, good 
governance, environmental sustainability, climate change, communicable and non-
communicable diseases and institutional development and capacity building. These areas 
shall also be eligible for Community support. 
 
SECTION 4 
THEMATIC AND CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES 
ARTICLE 32 
Environment and natural resources 
 
1. Cooperation on environmental protection and sustainable utilisation and management of 
natural resources shall aim at: 
(a) mainstreaming environmental sustainability into all aspects of development 
cooperation and support programmes and projects implemented by the various actors; 
(b) building and/or strengthening the scientific and technical human and institutional 
capacity for environmental management for all environmental stakeholders; 
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(c) supporting specific measures and schemes aimed at addressing critical sustainable 
management issues and also relating to current and future regional and international 
commitments concerning mineral and natural resources such as: 
(i) tropical forests, water resources, coastal, marine and fisheries resources, wildlife, 
soils, biodiversity; 
(ii) protection of fragile ecosystems (e.g. coral reef); 
(iii) renewable energy sources notably solar energy and energy efficiency; 
(iv) sustainable rural and urban development; 
(v) desertification, drought and deforestation; 
(vi) developing innovative solutions to urban environmental problems; and 
(vii) promotion of sustainable tourism. 
(d) Taking into account issues relating to the transport and disposal of hazardous waste. 
2. Cooperation shall also take account of: 
(a) the vulnerability of small island ACP countries, especially to the threat posed by 
climate change; 
(b) the worsening drought and desertification problems especially of least developed and 
land locked countries; and 
(c) Institutional development and capacity building 
 
ARTICLE 32A 
Climate change 
 
The Parties acknowledge that climate change is a serious global environmental challenge 
and a threat to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals requiring 
adequate, predictable and timely financial support. For these reasons, and in accordance 
with the provisions of Article 32, and particularly of point (a) of paragraph 2 thereof, 
cooperation shall:  
(a) recognise the vulnerability of ACP States and in particular of small islands and 
low-lying ACP States to climate-related phenomena such as coastal erosion, 
cyclones, flooding and environmentally induced displacements, and in particular 
of least developed and landlocked ACP States to increasing floods, drought, 
deforestation and desertification; 
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(b) strengthen and support policies and programmes to mitigate and adapt to the 
consequences of, and threat posed by, climate change including through 
institutional development and capacity building; 
(c) enhance the capacity of ACP States in the development of, and the participation 
in, the global carbon market; and 
(d) focus on the following activities: 
(i) integrating climate change into development strategies and poverty reduction 
efforts; 
(ii) raising the political profile of climate change in development cooperation, 
including through appropriate policy dialogue; 
(iii) assisting ACP states to adapt to climate change in relevant sectors such as 
agriculture, water management and infrastructure, including through transfer 
and adoption of relevant and environmentally sound technologies; 
(iv) promoting disaster risk reduction, reflecting that an increasing proportion 
of disasters are related to climate change; 
(v) providing financial and technical support for mitigation action of ACP states 
in line with their poverty reduction and sustainable development objectives, 
including reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation and 
reducing emissions in the agricultural sector; 
(vi) improving weather and climate information and forecasting and early 
warning systems; and 
(vii) promoting renewable energy sources, and low-carbon technologies that 
enhance sustainable development. 
 
TITLE II 
ECONOMIC AND TRADE COOPERATION 
CHAPTER 5 
TRADE RELATED AREAS 
ARTICLE 49 
Trade and Environment 
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1. The Parties reaffirm their commitment to promoting the development of international trade 
in such a way as to ensure sustainable and sound management of the environment, in 
accordance with the international conventions and undertakings in this area and with due 
regard to their respective level of development. They agree that the special needs and 
requirements of ACP States should be taken into account in the design and implementation of 
environmental measures, including in relation to the provisions of Article 32a. 
2. Bearing in mind the Rio Principles and with a view to reinforcing the mutual supportiveness 
of trade and environment, the Parties agree to enhance their cooperation in this field. 
Cooperation shall in particular aim at the establishment of coherent national, regional and 
international policies, reinforcement of quality controls of goods and services related to the 
environment, the improvement of environment friendly production methods in relevant 
sectors. 
3. The Parties agree that environmental measures should not be used for protectionist 
purposes. 
 44 
ANNEX II: extract of the EU mandate 
Title IV Environmental sustainability, climate change and sustainable management of 
natural resources 
 
The Agreement will acknowledge that environmental degradation and climate change pose a 
serious threat to the attainment of sustainable development, placing at high risk the life and 
the quality of life of current and future generations. In that respect, the Parties will recall that 
environment protection and the fight against climate change are closely linked with the other 
strategic priorities of the Agreement, notably peace and security, as well as sustainable and 
inclusive economic development. 
The Parties will commit to working together to accelerate progress towards the attainment of 
the Sustainable Development Goals that are related to environment and climate change, and 
towards the implementation of the Paris Agreement on climate change. 
The Parties will commit to strengthening cooperation and building effective alliances in 
international settings on relevant issues, in particular climate change, sustainable and 
renewable energy and energy efficiency efforts, ocean governance and water management, 
biodiversity and the promotion of nature-based solutions. They will also agree to mainstream 
environmental sustainability, climate change objectives and the pursuit of green growth into 
all policies, plans and investments, as well as to strengthen engagement with local authorities, 
civil society and the private sector, and to addressing any type of vulnerability, leaving no-one 
behind. 
The Parties will acknowledge that ambitious action on both mitigation and adaptation, 
including disaster risk reduction, is essential to manage and reduce the negative effects of 
climate change. To this effect, they will agree to put in place ambitious, quantifiable, and fair 
mitigation commitments, taking account of different national circumstances and evolving 
economic realities and capabilities. 
They will agree to integrate adaptation plans into national processes and to share experiences 
in order to achieve climate-resilient sustainable development. They will also commit to 
promoting investment and decent job creation into resource efficient and low-emission green 
economy. 
The Parties will support and promote initiatives to significantly increase the capacity of LDCs 
and SIDS to generate early-warning and risk information. 
The Parties will support, and mainstream in all policies, the conservation and sustainable 
management and use of natural resources, including land and water, the promotion of circular 
economy approaches and sustainable consumption and production practices, and the 
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conservation and sustainable management of biodiversity and ecosystems, including forestry 
and the fight against illegal trafficking of wildlife and timber. To achieve healthy and 
productive oceans, they will promote the protection and restoration of marine ecosystems and 
the conservation and sustainable management of ocean resources and sustainable fisheries, 
and will address the issue of ocean acidification. The Agreement will also include provisions 
to ensure the responsible governance of tenure of land, fisheries and forests. 
The Parties, in intensifying cooperation, will take into account: 
• the vulnerability of small island developing states and costal populations, especially 
the threat posed by climate change; 
• the exposure of countries to worsening droughts, floods, water scarcity, land and forest 
degradation, deforestation and desertification problems; 
• the links between disaster risk reduction and adaptation to climate change strategies 
and activities, as well as their close relation with resilience, climate change mitigation, 
ecosystem services and food security, and the nexus with displacement, migration and 
security. 
The Parties will cooperate in risk finance and transfer including contingency budgets, credits 
and risk transfer solutions, such as insurance solutions. 
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Annex III: Compared tables of content: the Cotonou agreement, the ACP mandate and the EU mandate 
Cotonou 2010 ACP Mandate (in French) EU Mandate 
PREAMBLE  
PART 1 — GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Title I — Objectives, Principles And Actors  
Title II — The Political Dimension 
PART 2 — INSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS  
PART 3 — COOPERATION STRATEGIES 
Title I — Development Strategies 
Title II — Economic And Trade Cooperation  
PART 4 — DEVELOPMENT FINANCE 
COOPERATION  
Title I — General Provisions 
Title II — Financial Cooperation  
Title III — Technical Cooperation  
Title IV — Procedures And Management 
Systems 
PART 5 — GENERAL PROVISIONS FOR 
THE LEAST DEVELOPED, 
LANDLOCKED AND ISLAND ACP 
STATES (LDLICS) 
PART 6 — FINAL PROVISIONS  
ANNEXES TO THE AGREEMENT  
Annex I — Financial Protocol 
Annex IA — Multi-Annual Financial 
Framework Of Cooperation Under This 
Agreement 
Annex IB — Multi-Annual Financial 
Framework 
For The Period 2008 To 2013 
PARTIE I CONTEXTE  
PARTIE II PRINCIPES DIRECTEURS POUR LES 
NÉGOCIATIONS  
PARTIE III OBJECTIFS D’UN ACCORD POST-
COTONOU  
PARTIE IV THÈMES TRANSVERSAUX  
A. Renforcement des capacités  
B. Vulnérabilité et renforcement de la résilience  
C. Océans et mers 
D. Changement climatique 
E. Égalité entre les hommes et les femmes 
F. Santé  
G. Jeunesse et dividende démographique 
H. Culture et développement 
I. Paix, sécurité et démocratie 
PARTIE V PILIERS THÉMATIQUES 
STRATÉGIQUES 
PILIER 1 : COMMERCE, INVESTISSEMENT, 
INDUSTRIALISATION ET SERVICES 
1. Contexte  
2. Objectifs Spécifiques  
3. Domaines De Coopération  
A. Commerce des biens et services  
B. Investissement  
C. Industrialisation  
PILIER 2: COOPÉRATION AU 
DÉVELOPPEMENT, TECHNOLOGIE, SCIENCE, 
INNOVATION ET  
1. NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE AGREEMENT 
2. FOUNDATION 
PART 1 COMMON PROVISIONS 
Title I Objectives 
Title II Principles 
Title III Political dialogue 
Title IV Policy coherence for development 
PART 2 STRATEGIC PRIORITIES 
Title I Human rights, fundamental freedoms, 
democracy, rule of law and good governance 
Title II Human development and dignity 
Title III Inclusive sustainable economic development 
Title IV Environmental sustainability, climate change 
and sustainable management of natural 
Resources 
Title V Peace, security and justice 
Title VI Migration and mobility 
PART 3 INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 
3. EU-AFRICA PARTNERSHIP 
Part 1 BASIS FOR COOPERATION 
Part 2 STRATEGIC PRIORITIES 
Title I Peace and security 
Title II Human rights, fundamental freedoms, 
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